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This paper analyzes the effects of economic reforms for different income groups. My 
interest is spurred by the international debate on the social consequences of reforms 
and the potential adverse effects on poverty in particular. I find that the poor are in 
general positively affected by trade reforms, inflationary control, and structural 
reforms, while government consumption reduction affects the poorest income 
quintile negatively. In countries having undertaken World Bank financed reforms 
actual income of the poor was higher than predicted. Moreover, as the impact of 
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A wave of structural adjustment programs followed the Latin American 
debt crisis in the early 1980s. Since then, many African and Asian 
countries experienced a similar process of crisis followed by structural 
adjustment, and many still are. Although the individual country 
experiences differ in many respects, the background stories appear to 
have much in common. Typically, large increases in public expenditure 
resulted in fiscal deficits. The ensuing gaps had to be closed by foreign 
borrowing, which in turn rendered the economies vulnerable. Exogenous 
shocks, such as deterioration in the terms of trade or sharply raised 
interest rates, subsequently precipitated serious external and internal 
imbalances.1  
Against this background, it is evident that some form of external crisis 
lies behind the implementation of most structural adjustment programs. 
The immediate objective of such programs has been to address 
unsustainable balance of payments situations. In the longer run, however, 
the programs also address issues related to investment and growth, since 
external balances can only be maintained by sustained economic 
recovery.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how economic reforms affect 
different income groups in the economy. My interest is spurred by the 
international debate on social consequences of reform and the potential 
adverse effects on poverty in particular.2 The reduction of government 
expenditure is often one of the most important aspects of the structural 
adjustment process, with potentially harsh implications for the well being 
of the poor. Can reforms that imply laying off government employees, 
eliminating subsidies on staple foods, and increasing real interest rates 
increase poverty, while still improving overall per capita GDP levels? Or 
does the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies favor the poor 
through increasing real wages, increasing employment opportunities, and 
improved access to capital markets? Particularly, I am interested in the 
effects of World Bank supported adjustment lending that has been taking 
place in many developing countries since 1980. In my analysis, I will 
investigate whether these World Bank financed reforms have affected the 
                                                        
1 In recent years, a new wave of reform programs has been undertaken under 
somewhat different circumstances. Several of the former communist countries of 
Eastern and Central Europe have undertaken structural reforms in their transition from 
centrally planned economies to more market oriented systems. 
2 See e.g. Jayarajah et al. (1996), Mohamed and Hassan (1997), and World Bank 
(1990 and 2000).  
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separate income groups in the reforming countries any differently from 
similar types of reforms in other countries. 
Unlike some earlier research, my primary interest lies in how economic 
policies affect absolute poverty, i.e. the level of per capita income of the 
poorest population groups, over time. I also investigate how these reforms 
affect relative poverty, i.e. income distribution, over time. The paper 
primarily adds to earlier research in that it analyzes the effects of 
economic reforms on different income levels over time through a 
systematic regression analysis using panel data for 55 countries, enabling 
an analysis of the effects of reforms in both industrialized and developing 
countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section I begin by 
describing the key characteristics of World Bank supported adjustment 
programs for developing countries. In the third section, I look at earlier 
research on poverty reduction and income inequality. The regression 
analysis is presented in section four, an analysis of World Bank supported 
reforms is conducted in section five, and my conclusions are presented in 





2. World Bank Supported Adjustment 
 
The first World Bank supported adjustment loan was signed in early 1980 
and lending reached its peak in 1988 when adjustment lending constituted 
almost 25 per cent of the World Bank’s total lending (Thomas and 
Chhibber, 1989). Over the past two decades, adjustment lending has 
accounted, on average, for at least 20 percent of total Bank lending. The 
objective of structural adjustment lending is to provide support for 
member countries experiencing serious balance of payments difficulties, 
or countries faced in the years ahead with the prospect of unmanageable 
deficits arising from external factors not likely to be easily or quickly 
reduced (Wright, 1980). A developing country has been shown to be 
more likely to take on a structural adjustment loan if it is highly indebted, 
when its current account deficit and debt to GDP ratio have increased and 
its terms of trade has deteriorated (Corbo and Rojas, 1992). 
In order to qualify for World Bank supported adjustment lending, a 
country must be willing to adopt appropriate changes in its policies and 
programs. Primarily, this means reducing the current account deficit to a 
level corresponding to the amount of external capital that is available on a 
regular basis, without straining its debt servicing capacity. The loans were  
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originally designed to provide support for macroeconomic policy reforms, 
such as trade policy and agricultural reforms. Lately, the focus is more on 
structural, financial sector, and social policy reform, and on improving 
public sector resource management with the aim to promote competitive 
market structures (legal and regulatory reform), correct distortions in 
incentive regimes (taxation and trade reform), establish appropriate 
monitoring and safeguards (financial sector reform), create an 
environment conducive to private sector investment (judicial reform), 
encourage private sector activity (privatization and public-private 
partnerships), promote good governance (civil service reform), and 
mitigate short-term adverse effects of adjustment (establishment of social 
protection funds).  
Several different studies have examined the effects of structural 
adjustment on the macroeconomy during the 1980s, although relatively 
less attention has been paid to the aspect of  poverty. For instance, 
Thomas and Chhibber (1989) studied the success of structural adjustment 
in 30 countries that received adjustment loans from the World Bank. 
Experience shows that adjustment programs were generally more easily 
sustained when countries adjusted quickly to shocks and maintained 
sound policies over the long term. The negative effects of structural 
adjustment on growth, employment, and poverty were short-lived and 
domestic supply responded quickly to policy changes. The programs were 
adequately financed, fully backed by the government, and viewed by the 
general public as necessary.  
In a similar study of 51 countries, McCleary (1989) found that policy 
changes were implemented quite successfully with regard to exchange 
rate management, energy policy, agricultural pricing, financial sector 
reforms, and the rationalization of public expenditure programs. 
Implementation was, however, less successful for industrial policies, tax 
reforms, and some aspects of public enterprise reforms. 
In a later study of 220 separate structural adjustment loans financed by 
the World Bank, Dollar and Svensson (1998) find that the success or 
failure of structural adjustment is to a large extent determined by a small 
number of political economy variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, 
government crisis, democracy, and government time in power. Variables 
under World Bank control, such as resources devoted to project 
preparation and supervision or number of loan conditions, appear to have 






3. Earlier research on poverty reduction 
and income inequality 
 
A few authors have made attempts at investigating the relation between 
economic reforms and poverty reduction. For instance, in a study by 
Jayarajah et al. (1996), the authors find that sound macroeconomic 
policies in reforming countries generally favored growth and poverty 
reduction in the period between 1980 and 1993.3 In their comparative 
study, 23 out of the 53 World Bank supported adjusting countries had 
sufficient poverty data available for reliable before and after compari-
sons.4 According to the authors, about two thirds of these countries 
implemented sound policies and as a consequence experienced both 
improved growth rates and reduced poverty in the post-adjustment period. 
Using ordinary least square regression analysis on cross-section data, 
effects on growth of macroeconomic policy performance for fiscal, mone-
tary, and exchange rate policies were evaluated. Successful stabilization 
signaled that the government had both the commitment and the ability to 
sustain economic reforms. 
In a comparative case study of the effects of adjustment on poverty in 
six African countries, Demery and Squire (1996) also demonstrate that 
poverty was more likely to decline in those countries that improved their 
macroeconomic balances, than in those that did not.5 The study uses data 
from household surveys for the six countries at two points in time during 
the 1980s and the 1990s, spanning between three to eight years for the 
different countries. Macroeconomic policy performance is evaluated 
using a weighted index constructed by the World Bank (1994), where 
                                                        
3 Macroeconomic policies were classified into three groups: internal balance, resource 
balance, and external balance. 
4 The authors use four different poverty lines (the headcount index (HDI), the poverty 
gap index, the squared poverty gap index, and a PPP adjusted poverty line) in testing 
the sensitivity of the poverty estimates to the choice of poverty lines. A relevant 
adjustment period was selected for each country, generally ranging from the 
beginning of the first loan to a year after the final disbursement. The pre-adjustment 
period ranges from 1970 until the year before the adjustment period, while the post-
adjustment period ranges from the year after the adjustment period until 1990. See 
Jayarajah and Branson (1995). 
5 Poverty is here measured by the HDI, i.e. the share of the population below a 
predetermined poverty line. The same poverty line is not used in all countries, as the 
focus of the study is not to compare levels of poverty between countries, but rather 
changes in poverty within countries.  
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macroeconomic policies such as fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate 
policies are combined into a single index.6 
The authors show that the link from adjustment to poverty goes 
through economic growth; countries that showed commitment to adjust-
ment efforts grew faster and in turn also experienced declining levels of 
poverty.7 In particular, depreciating the real effective exchange rate 
proved an important instrument as it benefited the poor both directly and 
indirectly. The authors do, however, make a particular note of the fact 
that the poorest of the poor have not always benefited from recent growth.  
In a recent article, Garuda (2000) looks at the effects of 58 IMF 
supported programs on Gini coefficients and income levels of the poor in 
39 countries betwen 1975 and 1991. Relative to non-program countries, 
the cross-country analysis reveals that income distribution as well as 
incomes of the poor deteriorated during economic reforms when pre-
program external imbalances were severe. When external imbalances 
were not as serious, program countries showed relative improvements in 
distributional indicators.  
A few other interesting studies look at how income distribution is 
affected by variables such as growth and other macroeconomic policy 
variables. Deininger and Squire (1998) use a new data set by the same 
authors from 1996 to examine the links between growth and income 
inequality. The new data set includes information on income inequality 
that meets minimum quality standards for 108 countries between 1960 
and 1992.8  
Looking at income growth determinants for different quintiles, in their 
panel data regression analysis, the authors find that investment is a 
positive and significant determinant for all income groups, where the poor 
benefit the most. They are, however, unable to establish any robust and 
consistent effects of either schooling, black market premium or financial 
development on income growth for specific quintiles and conclude that 
these major policy variables do not have any independent effects on the 
poor.  
Again using the new data sets on Gini indices from Deininger and 
Squire (1996) for 49 countries between 1947 and 1994, Li et al. (1997) 
find support for the arguments that political freedom and capital market 
liberalization explain intertemporal and international variations in income 
inequality. In their panel regression analysis, the authors also find that 
capital market deepening, political freedom, and secondary education are 
                                                        
6 The use as well as construction of this index has, however, been heavily criticized 
for its methodological and analytical shortcomings by Weeks (1997). 
7 The authors do not use the tools of formal regression analysis. 
8 These minimum quality standards are described in detail in Deininger and Squire 
(1996).  
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all positive significant explanatory variables of the income levels of both 
the poor and the rich.  
Making use of a new expanded data set by Lundberg and Squire 
(1999), Dollar and Kraay (2000) find that growth in average income is 
translated one-for-one into growth in income of the poor. In their panel 
regression analysis of about 80 countries, the effects of openness, 
government spending, education, and capital controls are insignificant, 
while inflation is the only policy variable that has a negative and 
significant effect on income growth of the poor. Nevertheless, as the 
authors include average GDP growth as an explanatory variable for 
income growth of the poor, the policy coefficients capture only the 
differential impact that a particular policy has on the income of the poor. 
Hence, the result suggests that policies that are good for growth are 
equally good for the poor, although growth from different sources may 






I use the tools of panel data regression analysis to investigate the effects 
of reforms on different income groups. As my sample of countries not 
only includes World Bank financed adjusters, I am able to compare the 
effects of particular reforms between both specific World Bank adjusters 
and others. 
 
1. The data 
The data I use in the analysis of this paper are drawn from the data set on 
income distribution by Deininger and Squire (1996), which only includes 
observations with households or individuals as units of observation.9 The 
data are based on representative samples covering all of the population as 
well as on comprehensive coverage of different income sources and 
population groups. Following recent literature, I compute the average 
income of the different population quintiles by multiplying real per capita 
GDP from Penn World Tables (PWT 5.6) with the quintile income share 
data from Deininger and Squire (1996).10 This renders the average 
income of each quintile as a share of the total population. Hence, in order 
                                                        
9 In order to minimize the problem of different methods being used in the original 
calculation of the indices, wherever needed, the authors have recalculated the Gini 
indices and the quintile shares using the computational tool POVCAL. See Deininger 
and Squire (1996). 
10 See e.g. Deininger and Squire (1998) and Li et al. (1997).  
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to get the average per capita income of each separate quintile, I multiply 
this figure by five. The study covers the period between 1966 and 1992 
and includes 55 countries.11 In my calculations, I only use data classified 
by Deininger and Squire (1996) as “high quality” data. 
The raw data on quintile shares from Deininger and Squire (1996) 
suffer from a few inconsistencies as income shares are measured either in 
gross income, net income or expenditure, and the units of observation are 
either households or individuals. How the data classifications are 
distributed is described in Table 1.12 What definitions are used could 
potentially affect my measure of income per capita in each quintile. 
Hence, in the regression analysis of the different income quintiles I 
introduce three separate dummy variables to account for income, gross 
income, and household data respectively. Distinguishing between income 
distribution gross or net of taxes may be of little relevance for a majority 
of the countries, i.e. the developing countries, where the role of 
redistributive taxes is quite low. Whether individual or household data are 
used may, however, well have a significant impact on my results.  
 
Table 1: Classifications of income inequality data. 
 
Household  123 Income  133 Gross  87 
Personal  52 Expenditure  42 Net  44 
      Undefined  2 
  175 Nob  175   133 
 
 
As discussed in section two, World Bank financed structural adjustment 
reforms typically focus on curbing inflation, reducing trade barriers, 
freeing controlled interest rates and prices, devaluing the nominal 
exchange rate, reducing the fiscal deficit by increasing revenues and 
decreasing expenditures, privatizing public enterprises, reducing domestic 
credit expansion etc. Although far from all countries covered by this 
study have undertaken World Bank supported programs, reforming these 
sectors are typically believed to have strong effects on macroeconomic 
performance in all countries. I will use proxies for the most common 
                                                        
11 Figures for the last five year period are restricted by the lack of per capita GDP data 
from the PWT 5.6 after 1992.  
12 Each observation is a five year average estimate containing no data inconsistencies 
among the separate data points.  
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structural reforms as explanatory variables in the formal regression 
analysis presented below. 
The data on policy variables are primarily data collected by Easterly et 
al. (1997). For the countries and time periods not included in their data 
base, I have supplemented data from the original sources. All original 
data sources are presented in the Appendix. 
The income sample means and the standard deviations for the different 
quintiles in industrialized and developing countries for the period 1966-
70 and 1990-92 respectively are presented in Table 2. The number of 
observations per country varies between one and six. As my sample 
includes both industrialized and developing countries, I am able to make 
comparisons of the effects of similar reforms in both groups.  
 
Table 2: Average quintile per capita income (current USD). 
 
Country group  Period    IncQ1  IncQ2  IncQ3  IncQ4  IncQ5 
Developing countries  1966-70  Mean  157  275  437  702  2041 
Nob  10  St. dev.  76  120  205  356  1207 
  1990-92  Mean   735  1334  1949  2933  7219 
Nob  15  St dev  631  1117  1599  2449  6072 
Industrialized countries  1966-70  Mean  992  1892  2662  3591  5988 
Nob  9  St. dev.  293  505  727  874  1500 
  1990-92  Mean   5787  11106  15922  21754  35358 




As my method of analysis, I employ a cross-country framework in which 
I relate countries’ levels of income for each population quintile to levels 
of the economic policy variables over time. I estimate a regression 
equation based on this framework for all countries and time periods for 
which data are available.  
There are several advantages to using panel data analysis compared to 
cross section or time series analysis (Baltagi, 1995, Easterly et al., 1997 
and Hsiao, 1986). First, the question I am asking is a dynamic one: how 
did income levels change when policies were altered during reforms? 
Second, as the variables of interest change significantly over time, using 
time series data provide a considerable wealth of information ignored in 
cross-sectional data averages. Third, panel data are more informative,  
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offer more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees 
of freedom, and more efficiency than cross section or time series data. 
Fourth, I am able to control for individual heterogeneity as the use of 
panel data allows me to control for both time and country specific effects.  
I use five-year averages of the data in the regression analysis. 
Compared to using a shorter time period, I achieve a more balanced 
panel, as the yearly data on quintile income shares are fairly limited and 
unevenly distributed over time. Moreover, for the reform variables 
included in the analysis, short-run fluctuations can be reduced which 
allows me to focus on the more important medium term relationships in 
the economy. Using a longer time period, say of ten years, I would on the 
other hand loose many degrees of freedom and not be able to capture 
policy changes during the adjustment periods. 
For each estimate of population quintile income levels, I first run 
ordinary least square (OLS) regressions where all coefficients are 
constant and the disturbance is assumed to capture differences over time 
and countries, then one-way fixed effect (FE) and one-way random effect 
(RE) models where slope coefficients are constant and the intercept varies 
over countries, and finally two-way FE and two-way RE models where 
slope coefficients are constant and the intercept varies over time and 
countries. In the FE models, the intercepts are assumed to be fixed like in 
a dummy variable model. In the RE models, the intercepts are assumed to 
be random leading to an error component model.13 In order to determine 
which model best captures the effects of reforms on the different income 
levels, I examine the standard F-test, the Hausman chi-squared statistics 
and the Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier statistics. Only the 
results of the preferred models are reported in the paper.14  
 
 
3. Income determinants 
As mentioned earlier, the net effect of economic reforms on the income 
levels of the poor have been much debated. While poor rural producers 
tend to benefit from agricultural, trade, and exchange rate reforms and 
from a demonopolization of important commercial activities, poor 
consumers, on the other hand, tend to be hurt by rising food prices as 
price controls are abolished (World Bank, 1994). A reduction in the rate 
of inflation should, however, directly benefit the poor as real wages will 
not be eroded over time.  
                                                        
13 For a more detailed description of panel data regression models, see Baltagi (1995), 
Hsiao (1986) or Judge et al. (1984). 
14 The results of the models that are statistically inferior in this sense are available 
from the author upon request.  
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In attempts to balance the government budget, subsidies that directly 
benefit the poor are often eliminated or drastically reduced. Moreover, 
government employees generally experience a decline in real wages, so 
that their relative income position tends to fall. Similarly, reductions in 
public sector employment increases poverty and worsens income 
distribution, particularly when these reductions are targeted at low-level 
government employees (Garuda, 2000). Many adjustment programs have 
arguably not paid enough attention to poverty reduction and ensuring 
adequate provision of services to the poor. As a consequence, social cost 
have begun to rise (Mohamed and Hassan, 1997). Cutting spending on 
public health care, education, sanitation, and water supply may lead to 
further deterioration of already low standards. 
The objective of most economic reforms is to raise overall per capita 
income levels rather than to redistribute income between different groups 
in society. This paper analyzes the effects of reforms on income levels 
and thus, I will also use level values of my policy variables. As for the 
various dimensions of economic reform, I follow Easterly et al. (1997) in 
my choice of variables.15  
As proxies for macroeconomic stabilization, I use the average annual 
rate of inflation and the rate of government consumption to GDP. The 
proxy for financial sector reform is the traditional measure of financial 
deepening, i.e. the average ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP. Reform of 
the external sector encompasses both trade reform and liberalization of 
the foreign exchange market. The proxies I use for these sector reforms 
are the average trade share of GDP and the average black market 
premium respectively.16 A proxy for “other structural reforms”, such as 
e.g. privatization of public enterprises, resolution of debt overhang 
problems, and liberalization of the foreign direct investment regime is 
also included, measured by the average rate of investment to GDP. 17  
Easterly et al. (1997) think of the investment variable as capturing the 
effects on income through the investment channel of all reforms, 
                                                        
15 Optimally, I would use reform variables that captured policy instruments, such as 
tariffs and quotas, capital constraints, measures of deregulation, privatization, tax 
revenues, financial sector policies etc. Due to lack of data, however, I am using 
proxies for these specific variables in my analysis, although I am well aware of the 
endogeneity problems that are involved. 
16 Using trade openness as a proxy for trade reform has recently been sharply 
criticized by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000). However, lacking alternative measures, I 
have decide to include the variable in my analysis.  
17 Total investment is the sum of public and private investment, where private 
investment may be endogenous to the reform process itself. A better measure of 
reform would be the share of public investment to GDP. Due to lack of data for this 
variable before 1970, it has not been included in my analysis as the sample would be 
reduced considerably.  
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including those already in the equation. Nevertheless, as the correlation 
coefficients between investment and the other policy variables are quite 
low in this sample, this is most likely not a serious issue. See Table 3. 
Following the arguments of Easterly et al. (1997) investment could also 
be capturing the effects of reforms that are difficult to quantify and are 
not included in the regression.18  
Presumably, the effect of a trade reform through lower tariffs should 
benefit all potential importers and consumers, rich as well as poor. To the 
extent that trade licenses and quotas are used, however, these may have a 
tendency to benefit the rich and powerful at the expense of the poor (Xu 
and Zou, 1997). Nevertheless, greater openness leads the sectors which 
were protected from import competition to contract. Since the poor 
receive a larger share of income from wages than the rich, and capital is 
more mobile than labor, the incomes of the poor may recover more 
slowly than those of the rich. Hence, the wage gap between low skilled 
and high skilled workers may increase in these sectors.  
As suggested by the Stolper-Samuelson theory, however, trade 
liberalization increases the demand for goods from the sector which 
intensively uses the relatively abundant factor in the economy. LDCs are 
presumably rich in unskilled labor, whose wages should rise both relative 
to skilled labor within the country and to unskilled labor in the developed 
countries. On the other hand, this same process should lead wages for 
skilled labor to rise in developed countries and to fall in LDCs and the net 
effect on global income distribution is inconclusive (Lundberg and 
Squire, 1999).  
The effect of government consumption on the poor should be positive, 
alleviating poverty through public spending on subsidies and health care 
etc, although the effect on the richer part of the population, i.e. the higher 
tax payers, could be negative.19 Increased financial deepening should 
benefit the poor as well as the rich, although the effect may be relatively 
stronger for the poor when they get increased access to credit and capital 
markets  (Li et al., 1997). I expect high levels of inflation to erode real 
wages with particular negative effects on the income of the poor. 
Nevertheless, high levels of inflation increase the amount of uncertainty 
in the economy which may reduce private investment and income levels 
for all groups in society. I expect the effect of the black market premium 
to be an indication of market imperfections (such as lack of goods and 
                                                        
18 The investment variable may also be affected by exogenous factors unrelated to 
reform, so that one could miscalculate the effects on income levels associated with 
reform when investment is introduced as a reform variable. 
19 That government consumption may have a negative effect on overall economic 
growth has been found in several empirical studies. See e.g. Barro (1991), Easterly 
and Rebelo (1993), and Levine and Renelt (1992).  
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foreign exchange) with negative effects for all income groups.20 The 
effect of total investment should be positive for all income groups. 
Although I focus my analysis on the explicit effects of economic policy 
on income levels, standard economic theory predicts that non-reform 
variables such as those included in the augmented Solow model in the 
famous paper by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) (i.e. the rate of 
physical capital accumulation, the rate of human capital accumulation, 
and the population growth rate), may also affect per capita income 
levels.21 Most likely due to their lack of variance over time, however, the 
latter two variables turn out to be insignificant in all of the separate 
regression analyses. As a consequence, they are omitted from the 
regression results presented below.22 Likewise, incorporating a variable 
measuring the terms of trade generates the same lack of significant 
results. 
Hence, I estimate the following log-linear regression model:23 
 
INCjit = a + b1OPENit-1 + b2GCit-1 + b3INFit-1 + b4M2it-1 + b5INVit-1 +  
b6BMPit-1 +Iit + Hit +Git + fi + lt + eit 
 
where INC is the log of the income level of the j:th population quintile in 
country i at time t, OPEN is the log of the trade share, GC is the log of the 
government consumption share, INF is the log of the inflation rate, M2 is 
the log of financial deepening, INV is the log of total investment, and 
BMP is the log of the black market premium.24 I is a dummy for income 
data, H is a dummy for household data, G is a dummy for gross income 
data. f is the country specific effect, l is the time specific effect, and e is 
the error term. As I believe that reforms generally do not affect the level 
of income instantaneously, I have lagged all measures of economic policy 
                                                        
20 Dollar and Kraay (2000) do not find any evidence that capital account liberalization 
is anti-poor. In fact, their coefficient for capital controls is insignificant. 
21 The rate of physical capital accumulation is here captured by the investment 
variable. 
22 Omitting these variables do not particularly affect neither the levels values nor the 
levels of significance of the coefficients for the remaining variables. The regression 
results including the rate of human capital accumulation (measured by the level of 
secondary education) and population growth are available from the author upon 
request. 
23 The foremost reason I have chosen the log-linear rather than the linear model 
specification is that the log-linear model specification allows for easier comparisons 
between variable coefficients. 
24 For some countries, the black market premium is zero. Instead of excluding these 
observations from the analysis, I assign the logged value to –1000.  
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one period.25 A correlation matrix for all lagged policy variables is 
presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients. 175 obs. 
 
  BMP  GC  INF  INV  M2  OPEN 
BMP   1.00  -0.48   0.37  -0.24  -0.61  -0.04 
GC     1.00  -0.20   0.12   0.49   0.24 
INF       1.00  -0.17  -0.43  -0.16 
INV         1.00   0.47   0.21 
M2           1.00   0.20 




I estimate separate regressions for the income levels of each population 
quintile. See Table 4. For all population quintiles, I find consistent 
evidence of both country and time specific effects. In all regressions, the 
country and time specific effects are correlated with the included 
explanatory variables and hence, the two-way FE models are the most 
appropriate. Moreover, all three dummy variables are significant in one 
income group or another. Hence, the dummy variables are included as 
control variables in all separate regressions, although they are not 
reported. 
I find that openness has a positive and significant impact on all 
separate income groups. Government consumption is a positive and 
significant determinant of income for the poorest two income quintile as 
expected but has no significant effect on the other income groups. The 
level of inflation is a negative and significant determinant of income in all 
but the poorest and the richest two quintiles.26 M2 is not a significant 
determinant of income in any of the five separate income groups. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the black market premium is a negative and 
significant determinant of income only for the richest population 
quintiles. Investment is a positive and significant determinant of income 
in all separate quintiles as expected.  
                                                        
25 I have experimented with different lag structures (no lags as well as two lags) but 
the above model specification has the highest explanatory power. The results from the 
regressions with other lag structures are available from the author upon request. 
26 The reason that inflation does not affect the income level of the poorest quintile 
may be that this particular group does not always participate in the monetized 
economy; instead people in this group often rely on subsistence farming or barter 
trade.  
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Summarizing, increasing openness and investment and lowering the rate 
of inflation will raise income levels of the poor. One must, however, keep 
in mind that the structural reforms aim at lowering government 
consumption, which will reduce incomes of the poorest quintile.27  As 
mentioned earlier, cutting spending on public health care, education, 
sanitation, and water supply may lead to further deterioration of already 
low standards. Moreover, layoffs of government employees may add to 
the number of poor people as many become unemployed.  
Looking at the separate income groups, openness appears to have the 
largest impact on the poorest income group with lower but similar effects 
on all the higher income quintiles. This finding implies that although 
increasing openness will raise income for all income groups, relative 
income inequality may actually fall. The coefficient for government 
consumption appears to be larger for the first quintile than for the second, 
indicating that a reduction in government consumption will increase 
income inequality.  
Testing the magnitude of the effects of different policy reforms, I find 
that a one per cent increase in the investment ratio will have a 
significantly larger positive effect on income than a similar decrease in 
the rate of inflation in all of the three middle income groups.28 The same 
holds true for a one percent increase in openness. In addition, the effect of 
a one percent increase in investment will have a significantly larger effect 
on income than a similar increase in openness in the third and fourth 
income quintiles.  I cannot detect any differences between the significant 
policy variables for the poorer two income groups. 
Using the dummy variable approach, I test for differences in the size of 
coefficients between LDCs and developed countries and find that the 
coefficient for openness is significantly higher in LDCs than in developed 
countries for all income groups. Moreover, the coefficient for government 
consumption is significantly smaller in LDCs than in developed countries 






                                                        
27 Nevertheless, lowering government consumption may increase resources available 
for investment in productive capital. This may in turn ensure higher economic growth 
in the longer run, also for the poorest quintile. 
28 I use the F-test to test for differences between all significant coefficients within the 
separate regressions.  
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Table 4: One lag reform model. Dependent variable:  
Ave income 
 
Quintile  Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Probability 
Q1  OPEN  0.38  2.54  0.01 
FE  GC  0.36  2.00  0.05 
2-WAY  INF  -0.02  -0.51  0.61 
Nob 175  M2  -0.03  -0.23  0.82 
Adj R-squared   BMP  -0.00  -0.82  0.41 
0.96  INV  0.36  2.31  0.02 
  CONSTANT  3.66  4.01  0.00 
         
Q2  OPEN  0.19  1.86  0.06 
FE  GC  0.21  1.71  0.09 
2-WAY  INF  -0.05  -1.66  0.10 
Nob 175  M2  -0.01  -0.06  0.95 
Adj R-squared   BMP  0.00  1.18  0.24 
0.98  INV  0.42  3.88  0.00 
  CONSTANT  5.26  8.42  0.00 
         
Q3  OPEN  0.20  2.10  0.04 
FE  GC  0.15  1.26  0.21 
2-WAY  INF  -0.06  -2.12  0.04 
Nob 175  M2  -0.05  -0.55  0.59 
Adj R-squared   BMP  -0.00  -0.18  0.86 
0.98  INV  0.46  4.63  0.00 
  CONSTANT  5.73  9.84  0.00 
         
Q4  OPEN  0.19  2.19  0.03 
FE  GC  0.15  1.49  0.14 
2-WAY  INF  -0.05  -2.00  0.05 
Nob 175  M2  -0.07  -0.89  0.37 
Adj R-squared   BMP  -0.00  -0.03  0.97 
0.99  INV  0.43  4.94  0.00 
  CONSTANT  6.16  12.01  0.00 
         
Q5  OPEN  0.18  2.18  0.03 
FE  GC  -0.04  -0.36  0.72 
2-WAY  INF  -0.03  -1.22  0.23 
Nob 175  M2  0.08  1.08  0.28 
Adj R-squared   BMP  -0.00  -1.70  0.09 
0.98  INV  0.37  4.20  0.00 
  CONSTANT  6.64  13.09  0.00  
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5. World Bank supported reforms 
 
A successfully implemented structural adjustment reform will lead to 
changes in the policy variables included in my regression analyses, such 
as increased openness, investment, and financial deepening as well as 
reduced government consumption, inflation, and black market premium. 
Taking a closer look at economic reforms during the two five-year 
periods of World Bank financed structural adjustment, I find that for most 
policy variables, level values were in general different for World Bank 
financed reformers and non-reformers, as can be seen in Table 5.29 In the 
first reform period, the non-reforming countries had significantly higher 
levels of openness, government consumption, and financial deepening. In 
the second reform period, the non-reforming countries had significantly 
higher levels of investment, government consumption, and financial 
deepening, while their levels of inflation and black market premium were 
significantly lower.30 Most of these statistical differences indicate that 
there was a cause for structural adjustment in these particular countries.  
As can be seen in Table 6, the adjusting countries in general did not 
seem to undertake particularly extensive reforms compared to the rest of 
the world. Looking at the average change in the reform variables between 
1976-80 and 1981-85, I find that openness and financial deepening were 
the only two variables that actually changed in the right direction. 
Comparing the extent of these reforms to reforms in other countries, I 
find that the adjusting countries on average increased financial deepening 
significantly more that did other countries.  
In the period between 1981-85 and 1986-90, all policy variables except 
government consumption, which remained stable, changed in the right 
directions in the adjusting countries. Moreover, the extent of the reforms 
significantly outperformed non-adjusters for openness, the black market 
premium and investment.  
To calculate how recent World Bank supported structural adjustment 
has affected income levels for the different population quintiles, I 
introduce a dummy variable for the reforming countries. The World Bank 
dummy variable is positive and statistically significant at the ten per cent 
level in all quintile regressions except for the richest quintile, indicating 
that World Bank supported reforms enhance income levels of the poor 
                                                        
29 Here all policy variable averages are measured in current time, i.e. they are not 
lagged one period. 
30 Using the Student’s t-test, I test for equality between mean level values. There were 
17 reforming countries in the period between 1981-85 and 12 reforming countries in 
the period between 1986-90. Only seven of these countries conducted World Bank 
supported reforms in both periods.  
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majority. Moreover, the coefficient for the World Bank dummy variable 
appears to be increasing with falling income groups, indicating that the 
poorer quintiles benefit more than the rich from World Bank support and 
that income inequality is reduced.  
The dummy variable does, however, also reflect both the fact that the 
countries were underperforming at the beginning of the period and that 
they were willing to undertake reforms. Hence, I expect it to be positive, 
both in support of the convergence hypothesis and because the reforms 
were needed and may have been undertaken even without the support of 
the World Bank.31 Which factor is actually the dominating one behind 
the positive and significant World Bank dummy variable is difficult to 
determine. 
 
Table 5: Reform averages, non-reforming and reforming 









Mean  47.05  12.03  28.82  33.39  1.03  22.01 





Mean  69.43  16.19  36.57  47.34  0.23  23.19 
    St dev  59.89  5.75  121.58  20.85  0.58  7.54 





Mean  54.68  13.11  32.52  27.79  0.85  18.04 





Mean  52.29  17.73  6.54  56.48  0.04  22.12 
    St dev  23.04  5.48  4.92  15.69  0.12  4.75 
Students t-test p      0.84  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.05  0.06 
 
 
                                                        
31 Contradicting these arguments, in a study of IMF programs on economic growth, 
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) find that program participation lowers growth rates 
for as long as countries remain under a program, grow faster once they leave the 
program, but not faster than they would have without the program.  
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Table 6: Percentage change in reform variables.  









2 %  1 %  98 %  11 %  27 %  -3 % 
Non-reforming  
Countries 
1976-1980 to  
1981-1985 
6 %  6 %  1 %  4 %  70 %  -8 % 
Reforming 
countries 
1981-1985 to  
1986-1990 





1981-1985 to  
1986-1990 
10 %  -3 %  -17 
% 
15 %  41 %  5 % 
 
 
Finally, I calculate actual and predicted income levels for the reforming 
countries, presented in Table 7. Looking at the results, I find that actual 
income levels in the reforming countries were significantly higher than 
predicted for all quintiles during both reform periods.32  
 
Table 7: Actual and predicted income for reforming countries 
1986-90 and 1991-92. 
 




Residual  Probability 
1986-90  Q1  6.64  6.35  0.28  0.00 
  Q2  7.24  6.93  0.31  0.00 
  Q3  7.62  7.30  0.32  0.00 
  Q4  8.01  7.71  0.30  0.00 
  Q5  8.87  8.57  0.29  0.00 
1991-92  Q1  6.31  6.14  0.16  0.04 
  Q2  6.88  6.74  0.14  0.07 
  Q3  7.26  7.11  0.15  0.07 
  Q4  7.65  7.50  0.14  0.07 
  Q5  8.51  8.39  0.12  0.10 
 
 
                                                        
32 I use the Students t-test to test if the sample means are equal for actual and 
predicted income levels.  
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Thus, I find no evidence of the potentially adverse effects of reforms on 
poverty in this sample of countries. Rather, I must conclude that World 
Bank reforms have contributed to reduced income inequality and higher 
income levels for the poor majority. This includes the poorest quintile and 




6. Conclusion  
 
This paper analyses how economic reforms affect different income 
groups in the economy. Particularly, I look at the effects on the poor and 
the effects of World Bank supported adjustment lending that took place in 
many developing countries during the 1980s.  
Comparing my findings to those of Dollar and Kraay (2000), who only 
present the direct effects of specific policies on different income groups, 
my results capture the total (i.e. direct plus indirect) effects.33 Although 
Dollar and Kraay (2000) find that inflation is the only policy variable that 
has a direct effect on income of the separate groups, they make no effort 
to estimate the indirect effect of the specific policy variable, which is just 
taken as given. Hence, with the results from this study at hand, a country 
will be better suited to choose a pro-poor policy mix of economic 
reforms. 
I find that reform variables such as openness, investment, inflation, and 
government consumption are important income determinants for the poor. 
Looking at the separate income groups, openness has the largest impact 
on the poorest income group with lower but similar effects on all the 
higher income quintiles. Contradicting the popular debate about how 
globalization is harmful for the poor, this result implies that increasing 
openness will both raise overall income and reduce income inequality. 
Moreover, as the effect of openness is larger in LDCs than in developed 
countries, increased trade may also reduce global inequality.  
The coefficient for government consumption is larger for the first 
quintile than for the second, indicating that a reduction in government 
consumption may increase income inequality. The effect is, however, 
smaller in LDCs than in the developed countries. 
Despite the heavy criticism of World Bank supported structural 
adjustment, I find that the World Bank financed reforms per se appear to 
have contributed to higher than predicted income levels for all groups in 
                                                        
33 By direct effect, they mean the effect of a particular economic policy on income growth of a specific 
income group. By indirect effect, they mean the effect of an economic policy on overall growth, which 
in turn affects income of a specific income group.   
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society, including the poorest quintile. Moreover, contrary to the findings 
of Easterly (2000), the effect of World Bank support appears to benefit 
the poorer quintiles more than the rich, leading to a reduction of the 
income inequality. Hence, some allegations against World Bank reforms 
are not supported by the empirical evidence.  




The following is a list of countries covered in my study. My panel data 
set is unbalanced and I indicate for what time periods I have data, both for 
the dependent variable as well as for the lagged explanatory variables, in 
each of the 55 countries (175 observations). A star represents that the 
country undertook a World Bank financed structural adjustment program 
in the previous period. 
 
Country  1966-70  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986-90  1991-92 
ALGERIA                   X   
AUSTRALIA         X    X  X  X  X 
BANGLADESH              X  X*  X* 
BOLIVIA                   X   
BRAZIL            X  X  X  X  X*   
CANADA            X  X  X  X  X  X 
CHILE             X  X      X   
COLOMBIA          X  X  X    X*  X* 
COSTA RICA          X  X  X  X*   
DENMARK               X  X  X  X 
DOMINICAN REP.          X  X   
EL SALVADOR           X       
FINLAND           X    X  X  X  X 
FRANCE                X       
GERMANY, WEST     X  X  X  X     
GHANA                     X*  X* 
GREECE              X    X  X   
GUATEMALA             X    X  X 
HONDURAS          X          X* 
HONG KONG               X  X   
INDIA             X  X  X  X  X*  X 
INDONESIA             X  X  X   
IRELAND             X  X    X   
ITALY                 X  X  X  X 
JAMAICA             X      X*  X* 
JAPAN             X  X  X  X     
JORDAN                    X   
KENYA                       X* 
KOREA, REP.         X  X  X  X*   
MALAYSIA              X  X  X   
MAURITIUS                 X*  X* 
MEXICO            X  X  X  X  X*  X* 
NETHERLANDS         X  X  X  X  X 
NORWAY            X  X  X  X  X  X 
PAKISTAN          X  X  X  X  X*  X* 
PANAMA            X    X       
PERU                    X  X   
PHILIPPINES         X    X  X*   
PORTUGAL    X  X    X*    
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Country  1966-70  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986-90  1991-92 
RWANDA                  X     
SENEGAL                     X* 
SINGAPORE                 X   
SPAIN               X  X  X  X   
SRI LANKA         X  X  X  X  X   
SWEDEN            X  X  X  X  X  X 
THAILAND          X  X    X  X*  X 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO         X     
TUNISIA                   X*   
TURKEY            X        X*   
U.K.              X  X  X  X  X  X 
U.S.A.            X  X  X  X  X  X 
UGANDA                      X* 
VENEZUELA             X  X  X   
ZAMBIA                X      X* 




BMP Data on black market premium are from Wood “Global Trends 
in Real Exchange Rates” 1960-84, World Currency Yearbook, 
1985, International Currency Analysis, 1990-93 (1st choices), 
and for missing observations Barro & Lee (2nd choice). 
GC Data on government consumption as a share of GDP come 
from World Bank (1st choice, 1961-93) and PWT 5.6 (2nd 
choice, 1950-92). 
GINI Data on Gini coefficients are from Deininger and Squire 
(1996). 
INC Data on income levels are calculated using average real per 
capita GDP (current international prices) from Penn World 
Tables 5.6 (PWT 5.6) and quintile income share data from 
Deininger and Squire (1996). 
INF Inflation rates are calculated using CPI data from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) (1st choice -93) and WDI (2nd choice, 
1970-95). 
INV Data on investment as a share of GDP are from the World Bank 
(1st choice, -93) and PWT 5.6 (2nd choice - 92). 
IPCGDP Data on initial real per capita GDP (1960 international prices) 
are from PWT 5.6. 
M2 Data on financial deepening are calculated using M2 and CPI 
data from IFS. Statistic is (M2/end of year CPI)/(GDP/average 
year CPI). 
OPEN Data on imports plus exports as a share of GDP come from 
World Bank 1st choice, 1961-90), World Development 
Indicators (WDI) (2nd choice, 1970-95), and PWT 5.6 (3rd 
choice, 1950-92).  
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